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Abstract	This	research	examines	how	activists	mobilise	against	fake	hate	profiles	on	Facebook.	Based	on	six	months	of	participant	observation,	the	article	demonstrates	how	Danish	Facebook	users	organised	to	combat	fictitious	Muslim	profiles	that	spurred	hatred	against	ethnic	minorities.	The	article	concludes	that	crowdsourced	action	by	Facebook	users	is	insufficient	as	a	form	of	sustainable	resistance	against	fake	hate	profiles.	A	viable	solution	would	require	social	media	companies	such	as	Facebook	to	take	responsibility	in	the	struggle	against	fake	content	used	for	political	manipulation.	
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Introduction	This	is	how	we	shut	his	page	down.	We’re	nearly	1300	members	and	if	we	each	spend	5	seconds	reporting	his	page,	it’ll	be	removed	in	no	time.		(Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook,	post	by	admin,	1	July	2015)	
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	In	June	2015,	a	closed	Facebook	group	named	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	
Facebook	(STOP	falske	HAD-PROFILER	på	FACEBOOK)	was	created	to	combat	fake	profiles	spurring	anti-Muslim	discourses	in	Denmark.	Within	24	hours,	the	group	attracted	over	1000	members	engaging	in	several	forms	of	cooperative	contestation.	Most	notably,	the	group	used	collective	reporting	of	content	for	violations	of	Facebook’s	community	standards	(Facebook,	2016).		
	
Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	was	created	in	reaction	to	several	Facebook	pages	that	sparked	hundreds	of	hateful	comments	and	shares	from	Danish	Facebook	users	in	spring	2015.	These	pages	were	all	constructed	around	fictitious	Muslim	identities,	claiming	to	represent	a	wider	Muslim	community	in	Denmark.	Their	consistent	message	was	that	Danish	Muslims	were	conspiring	to	take	over	the	country,	rape	Danish	(white)	women,	and	kill	all	non-Muslims	(Farkas	et	al.,	2017).	Most	users	who	reacted	to	this	hateful	content	did	not	realise	the	identities	were	fake	and	expressed	aggression	as	well	as	xenophobic	sentiments	in	comments.	Furthermore,	users	who	contested	the	pages’	authorship	in	comments	were	systematically	removed	and	blocked	by	the	anonymous	page	administrator(s).		Journalists	from	the	Danish	public	service	broadcaster	(Danmarks	Radio)	eventually	reported	on	the	phenomenon,	highlighting	that	the	Facebook	pages	were	fake	and	likely	constructed	by	far-right	activists	to	smear	Muslims	(Nielsen,	2015).	The	latter	finding,	however,	could	not	be	positively	confirmed,	as	Facebook	enables	page	administrators	to	remain	invisible,	challenging	any	
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legal	action	against	them.	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	thus	represented	the	only	systematic	attempt	to	resist	and	combat	the	fake	Muslim	Facebook	pages.	This	occurred	through	crowdsourced	reporting	of	the	pages	to	Facebook	in	order	to	get	the	company	to	close	them	down.		The	power	of	crowdsourced	online	activism	as	a	form	of	collective	resistance	has	long	been	heralded,	though	particularly	in	the	early	days	of	social	media	(Benkler,	2006;	Jenkins,	2006;	Shirky,	2009).	Scholars	have	argued	that	datafication	of	personal	information	and	the	rise	of	many-to-many	communication	enables	new	forms	of	political	mobilisation	based	on	a	politics	of	numbers	(Loader	and	Mercea,	2011).	A	core	aspect	of	such	political	mobilisation	is	crowdsourced	collective	action	(in	the	streets	and	online),	often	through	social	media	platforms	that	enable	large-scale	coordination	and	organisation	(Lotan	et	al.,	2011).	There	are,	however,	limitations	to	this	form	of	action.	Given	the	increasing	range	of	opportunities	for	engagement	in	the	digital	era,	it	has	become	common	to	lament	that	online	participation	is	no	more	than	feel-good	‘slacktivism’	(Morozov,	2011),	‘clicktivism’	(White,	2010),	or	altogether	lacking	a	collective	altruistic	component	(Bauman,	2001).	While	this	criticism	might	ring	partially	true	in	the	case	of	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	
Facebook,	this	article	argues	that	participation	and	activism	organised	in	the	group	was	conditioned	and	limited	by	Facebook’s	digital	architecture.	Based	on	participant-observational	findings,	the	article	explores	the	challenges	that	Stop	
Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	faced	in	its	struggle.	Drawing	upon	these	findings,	the	article	suggests	that	crowdsourcing	user	action	can	only	make	a	marginal	contribution	to	sustainably	preventing	fake	hate	profiles	on	social	
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media	under	current	conditions.	A	sustainable	solution	would	require	that	Facebook	takes	on	greater	responsibility	as	a	company	and	provide	more	than	its	currently	limited	and	opaque	user	support.			
The	crowdsourcing	ideology	on	social	media	Jeff	Howe	coined	the	term	‘crowdsourcing’	in	2006	in	a	Wired	article.	The	idea	of	crowds	acting	and	creating	together	was	present	in	early	discourses	about	social	media.	Tim	O’Reilly’s	(2005)	concept	of	‘Web	2.0’	had	the	“wisdom	of	the	crowds”	as	a	key	component.	These	ideas	mainly	included	crowdsourcing	in	a	business	context,	focusing	on	bottom-up	creative	processes	in	which	companies	adopt	ideas	from	crowds,	fans,	and	amateurs.	In	a	discourse	analysis	of	popular	press	articles	concerning	crowdsourcing,	Brabham	(2012,	p.	407)	concludes	that	the	concept	was	also	promoted	as	“a	potentially	powerful	tool	to	spur	public	participation	and	transparency	in	government	affairs.”	Brabham	argues,	however,		that	the	‘amateur’	label	in	this	context	delegitimises	otherwise-worthy	agents	by	devaluing	their	roles	as	participants	and	citizens	in	democratic	society.	Liberatory	technological	discourses	–	a	powerful	part	of	the	corporate	identities	of	social	media	companies	such	as	Google	and	Facebook	(Turner,	2006)	–	have	thus	been	adopted	in	both	contemporary	business	cultures	and	democratic	discourses	and	processes.			Based	on	an	analysis	of	the	political	economy	of	the	digital	media	industry,	Sandoval	(2014,	p.	252)	argues	that,	rather	than	being	social	(as	asserted	in	corporate	social	responsibility	statements),	social	media	companies	exploit	labour	and	“are	feeding	on	the	commons	of	society.”	Social	media	and	other	
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tech	companies	co-opt	ideas	of	the	radical	left,	such	as	participation,	decentralisation,	spontaneous	interaction,	and	lack	of	discipline	and	hierarchy	(Žižek,	2009),	in	concepts	such	as	crowdsourcing.	These	discourses	of	empowerment,	however,	shift	the	obligation	for	action	on	social	media	to	the	users.	This	creates	potentials	for	user	action	as	well	as	disempowerment	since	social	media	companies	can	disown	corporate	responsibility	for	phenomena	on	their	platforms	such	as	fake	hate	profiles.			Facebook’s	community	standards	state	that	the	company	strives	“to	welcome	people	to	an	environment	that	is	free	from	abusive	content.	To	do	this,	we	rely	on	people	like	you”	(Facebook,	2016).	The	company’s	model	for	handling	abusive	content	is	thus	built	around	free	user	labour.	This	is	economically	beneficial	for	Facebook,	as	it	only	employs	commercial	content	moderators	to	review	content	reported	by	cost-free	users	(Fuchs,	2015;	Roberts,	2016).	It	also	enables	the	company	to	distance	itself,	both	legally	and	communicatively,	from	abusive	material	on	its	platform	by	granting	users	primary	responsibility.	This	evasion	strategy	is	central	to	Facebook,	which	is	currently	seeking	to	increase	this	delegation	of	responsibility:	“The	idea	is	to	give	everyone	in	the	community	options	for	how	they	would	like	to	set	the	content	policy	for	themselves”	(Zuckerberg,	2017).	As	we	show	in	this	article,	Facebook’s	user-centred	approach	is	problematic,	as	the	company	circumvents	responsibility	for	countering	abuse	while	providing	inadequate	and	opaque	tools	for	user	action.	This	disempowers	users	and	limits	the	potential	for	counteracting	phenomena	such	as	fake	hate	profiles.		
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Activism	and	social	media	logics	Many	challenges	confront	activists	using	corporate	social	media	platforms	to	counter-act	dominant	discourses,	including	racism.	Poell	and	Borra	(2011,	p.	695)	note	that	for	“crowd-sourcing	alternative	[news]	reporting,”	the	content	of	tweets	is	framed	by	mainstream	news	to	produce	visibility.	Leistert	(2015)	argues	that	corporate	social	media	have	become	algorithmic	mass	media,	using	algorithms	to	censor,	normalise,	and	standardise	activist	communications.	The	silencing	of	critical	voices	reinforces	neoliberal	values	in	which	corporate	social	media	platforms	are	embedded	(Couldry,	2010).	In	order	to	successfully	achieve	political	goals,	activists	in	social	media	environments	must	thus	adapt	their	political	strategies	to	corporate	social	media	logics	such	as	connectivity,	popularity,	and	datafication	(van	Dijck	and	Poell,	2013).	Through	this	adaptation,	activists	risk	being	co-opted	by	the	social	media	logics	that	they	attempt	to	use	against	the	system	(Galis	and	Neumayer,	2016).	In	other	words,	instead	of	empowering	activists,	“power	has	partly	shifted	to	the	technological	mechanisms	and	algorithmic	selections	operated	by	large	social	media	corporations”	(Poell	and	van	Dijck,	2015,	p.	534).			In	his	philosophy	of	technology,	Feenberg	(2002)	focuses	on	human	agency,	arguing	that	technology	reinforces	prevailing	political	hierarchies	and	power	relations.	Feenberg	suggests,	however,	that	technological	invention	also	provides	new	opportunities	for	subversive	actors	to	challenge	political	systems	by	appropriating	new	media	technologies	for	their	cause.	A	critical	analysis	of	technology	must	consequently	be	“balanced	by	description	of	what	people	actually	do	in	practice”	(Mackenzie,	2006,	p.	458).	This	requires	us	to	open	the	
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black	box	of	social	media	materiality	“as	active	agents	shaping	the	symbolic	and	organizational	processes	of	social	actors”	(Milan,	2015,	p.	897).	In	the	following,	we	seek	to	unpack	this	black	box	by	analysing	the	social	media	practices	of	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook.	In	so	doing,	we	explore	how	the	group	navigates	social	media	logics	in	its	struggle	against	fake	hate	profiles.		
A	participant-observational	inquiry	This	article	builds	upon	data	collected	during	six	months	of	participant	observation	within	the	closed	Facebook	group	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	
Facebook.	The	fieldwork	commenced	in	late	June	2015,	shortly	after	the	creation	of	the	group,	and	ended	in	early	January	2016.	Levels	of	activity	within	the	group	varied	over	the	course	of	the	six	months,	with	concentrations	around	occurrences	of	fake	hate	profiles.	During	the	research	period,	Stop	Fake	
Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	contested	eight	fake	hate	profiles,	which	attracted	a	total	of	over	14,000	comments	and	6000	shares	from	Danish	Facebook	users.	Prior	to	the	group’s	creation,	data	from	five	fake	Muslim	Facebook	pages	had	already	been	collected	in	April	and	May	2015	(Farkas	et	al.,	2017).	When	Stop	
Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	was	created	in	response	to	fake	Muslim	Facebook	pages,	it	was	thus	possible	to	initiate	research	within	the	group	shortly	thereafter.	Data	on	fake	hate	profiles	collected	prior	to	the	existence	of	the	group	enables	a	comparative	perspective	on	fictitious	profiles	before	and	after	initiation	of	the	group’s	collective	contestation.			The	dataset	of	13	fake	hate	profiles	–	eight	of	which	were	contested	by	Stop	
Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	–	derives	from	our	qualitative	approach.	Based	
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on	online	participant	observations	(Hine,	2015),	our	research	objective	is	to	explore	and	investigate	the	people,	objects,	controversies,	conflicts,	and	negotiations	surrounding	fake	hate	profiles	and	the	struggle	against	them.	Throughout	the	six	months	of	research,	we	continuously	observed	and	participated	in	the	activities	of	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook.	This	involved	a	high	degree	of	engagement.	We	supported	the	group’s	cause	and	interacted	regularly	with	group	members,	particularly	the	group	administrator.	The	primary	purpose	of	these	interactions	(which	can	best	be	described	as	informal	dialogues)	was	to	understand	the	ways	in	which	the	group	was	organised	and	operated.	Based	on	these	observations,	this	article	seeks	to	unravel	the	delicate	practices	and	tactics	of	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	
Facebook	as	well	as	the	challenges	facing	the	group’s	crowdsourced	user	action.	In	future	work,	quantitative	measures	could	advantageously	be	included	to	examine	the	scale	and	proliferation	of	fake	hates	profiles	such	as	those	contested	by	this	group.			Informed	consent	was	secured	from	members	of	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	
Facebook	by	first	contacting	the	page	administrator	and	receiving	permission	from	him.	We	thereafter	asked	the	administrator	to	post	a	statement	in	the	group	for	all	members	to	see,	disclosing	our	research	agenda	and	requesting	permission	to	do	fieldwork.	In	this	statement,	we	assured	group	members	that	we	would	protect	everyone’s	anonymity.	The	group	responded	positively	to	our	request.	User	activity	within	the	group	was	archived	through	screenshots	and	‘print	page’	functionalities	to	ensure	the	existence	of	data	in	case	the	group	or	its	content	were	deleted.	In	total,	we	collected	38	posts	(all	made	by	the	
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group	administrator)	and	943	comments.	Subsequent	to	our	fieldwork,	all	names	of	group	members	have	been	anonymised,	and	the	act	of	translation	from	Danish	to	English	renders	the	content	unsearchable.	
	
Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	As	its	name	suggests,	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	was	created	with	the	purpose	of	finding	and	combatting	what	it	terms	‘fake	hate	profiles’	on	Facebook.	In	the	group’s	mission	statement,	this	term	encompasses	“fake	profiles	[…]	groups,	or	pages	created	to	incite	fear	and	hatred	towards	specific	groups	in	Danish	society”	(Post	by	group	administrator,	21	June	2015).	The	group’s	objective	was	to	expose	and	combat	such	profiles	through	collective	efforts	using	Facebook’s	digital	architecture	and	community	standards.	All	group	members	could	invite	new	users	to	the	group,	though	they	had	to	be	approved	by	the	administrator.	The	group	was	explicitly	non-partisan,	and	political	discussions	were	not	allowed.			The	fake	hate	profiles	combatted	by	the	group	were	identified	on	the	basis	of	a	number	of	characteristics,	most	prominently:	use	of	stolen	profile	pictures,	falsely	proclaimed	affiliations	with	existing	organisations;	deletion	of	user	comments	questioning	the	profiles’	authorship,	lack	of	response	when	contacting	the	profiles,	and	rhetoric	similar	to	that	of	previous	profiles	identified	as	fake.	The	fake	hate	profiles	used	fictitious	Muslim	identities	to	construct	a	narrative	of	Muslims	plotting	to	overrun	Danish	society,	killing	and	raping	ethnic	(white)	Danes	in	the	process:			
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Islam	is	NOT	about	peace	but	subjugation	to	Allah.	Once	we	get	sharia	law	in	Denmark,	all	you	infidel	pigs	will	have	to	submit	to	Islam…	It’s	okay	to	kill,	as	long	as	the	victims	are	infidels.	Allahu	Akhbar!	(Facebook	post,	Mohammed	El-Sayed,	30	June	2015)		You	Danes	can	laugh	at	me	now,	but	just	wait	until	we	get	sharia	law	in	Denmark,	then	all	non-Muslims	will	be	‘removed’	(if	you	know	what	I	mean)	
J.	Allahu	Akhbar!	You	should	by	the	way	know	that	I	take	your	money,	I	have	sex	with	your	cheap	women,	and	I	make	them	pregnant.		(Facebook	post,	Mehmet	Dawah	Aydemir	[1],	9	September	2015)		Most	posts	from	these	fake	hate	profiles	contained	direct	threats	to	oppress,	rape,	and	kill	(non-Muslim)	Danes.	Others	provoked	by	rejoicing	in	the	September	11	terrorist	attacks	or	stating	that	all	Danes	are	stupid	pigs	and	dogs.	On	all	profiles,	the	aggressive	statements	were	presented	as	originating	from	young,	Danish-speaking	Muslims	living	in	Denmark	(Farkas	et	al.,	2017).	These	fictitious	identities	were	all	constructed	around	existing	xenophobic	stereotypes	of	Muslims	as	violent,	hypersexual,	and	alien	threats	to	the	Danish	welfare	state	(Hervik,	2011).	Stolen	images,	text,	and	hyperlinks	were	thus	all	deployed	to	personify	these	stereotypes	as	credible	and	authentic	individuals.	On	each	profile,	images	of	Arab-looking	people	were	presented	alongside	links	to	existing	Muslim	organisations,	posts	about	Muslims	destroying	Denmark	from	within,	and	images	of	burning	Danish	flags	or	the	flag	of	ISIS.	The	fake	profiles	all	claimed	to	speak	on	behalf	of	a	wider	Muslim	community	in	Denmark,	all	participating	in	a	large-scale	conspiracy:	“We	Muslims	have	come	
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to	stay.	We	haven’t	come	in	peace,	but	to	take	over	your	shitty	country”	(Facebook	posts,	Zahra	Al-Sayed,	2	July	2015).	Rhetoric	and	wording	were	highly	similar	across	the	pages,	indicating	that	their	creators	were	likely	connected	or	identical.	As	Facebook	enables	page	administrators	to	remain	completely	anonymous,	however,	the	actual	identities	and	motives	of	these	authors	cannot	be	established.	Consequently,	in	terms	of	motive,	we	can	only	conclude	that	all	fake	hate	profiles	deliberately	sought	to	provoke	and	spark	anti-Muslim	aggression	from	Danish	Facebook	users	–	an	agenda	in	which	they	largely	succeeded.		Across	the	various	fake	hate	profiles,	the	violent	rhetoric	prompted	thousands	of	user	comments	from	Danes	believing	in	the	stated	authorship	and	responding	with	hatred	towards	the	fictitious	identities	as	well	as	Muslims	and	immigrants	in	general:			 Go	home	to	your	own	country!	We	didn’t	ask	you	to	come	here	to	our	country”	 (User	comment,	Mehmet	Dawah	Aydemir	[1],	9	September	2015)		What	the	fuck	is	this,	you	fucking	pig!!!	We	help	you	come	to	Denmark	and	this	is	how	you	thank	us!		(User	comment,	Mehmet	Dawah	Aydemir	[1],	9	September	2015)	
	Not	all	users	reacted	with	aggression	towards	the	fictitious	Muslim	identities.	Numerous	users	actively	tried	to	dismantle	the	hatred	and	warn	others	that	
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the	profiles	were	fake.	The	anonymous	page	administrators,	however,	systematically	obstructed	such	attempts,	as	we	show	below.			
Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	was	formed	in	June	2015	to	organise	and	increase	contestation	of	fake	hate	profiles.	This	contestation	involved	four	distinct,	concurrent	processes:	(1)	finding	and	reporting	pages,	(2)	alerting	users,	(3)	alerting	journalists	and	authorities,	and	(4)	speculating	about	culprits.	These	processes	were	continuously	negotiated	and	iteratively	developed	by	group	members	in	order	to	increase	the	effectiveness	of	their	efforts.	In	the	following	sections,	we	explore	the	group’s	crowdsourced	contestation,	focusing	on	the	socio-technical	tactics	deployed	in	their	struggle.	Based	on	this	examination,	we	discuss	the	limitations	and	opportunities	for	crowdsourced	user	action	on	social	media	and	their	implications	for	the	prevention	of	fake	hate	profiles.		
(1)	Finding	and	reporting	fake	hate	profiles	on	Facebook	The	first	step	in	the	group’s	contestation	was	to	search	for	Facebook	profiles,	groups,	or	pages	using	fictitious	identities	to	disseminate	hate	speech.	When	members	located	such	content,	they	would	contact	the	group	administrator	and	get	him	to	share	a	link	within	the	group	alongside	a	short	statement,	for	example:			 We’ve	received	a	tip	from	a	member	and	it	seems	this	profile	is	fake.	The	rhetoric	is	similar	to	previous	profiles,	and	I	will	therefore	encourage	you	all	to	report	the	page,	so	we	can	shut	it	down.	
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(Post	by	group	administrator,	5	January	2016).			Users	would	follow	the	link	and	report	the	profile	to	Facebook	for	violations	of	the	company’s	community	standards,	which	prohibit	both	fake	identities	and	hate	speech	(Facebook,	2016).	Key	to	this	operation	was	Facebook’s	‘report’	button,	which	can	be	found	on	all	profiles	and	pages	as	well	as	posts,	pictures,	and	videos.	When	reporting	violations	to	Facebook,	group	members	would	subsequently	post	comments	within	the	group,	often	simply	writing:	‘Reported’.	Members	would	thereby	continuously	make	their	(otherwise-invisible)	actions	visible	to	each	other.	Some	users	deliberately	reported	the	same	profile	for	numerous	violations	(e.g.	fake	identity,	hate	speech,	harassment)	and	also	reported	its	individual	posts.	This	was	done	in	the	hope	that	larger	quantities	of	reports	would	cause	Facebook	to	pay	more	attention.			Facebook’s	processing	of	filed	user	reports	is	a	highly	opaque	process	(Roberts,	2016),	making	it	difficult	to	discern	how	the	company	operates.	Consequently,	group	members	would	iteratively	exchange	personal	experiences	and	hypotheses	in	an	attempt	to	maximise	the	effectiveness	of	their	crowdsourced	contestation.	A	recurrent	finding	by	group	members	was	that	the	quantity	of	reports	played	a	major	role	in	Facebook’s	response,	although	the	company	officially	denies	this	(Facebook,	2016).	Often,	when	filing	reports,	group	members	would	initially	receive	a	standard	response	from	Facebook,	stating	that	the	reported	profile(s)	did	not	violate	Facebook’s	community	standards.	Group	members	would	take	screenshots	of	these	replies	and	post	them	within	the	group	accompanied	with	statements	of	disbelief:		
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	 Really!?	They’ve	checked	the	page	and	won’t	shut	it	down…	!!!”		(Comment	by	group	member,	22	June	2015)	I	can’t	believe	Facebook	claims	this	isn’t	violating	their	community	standards?	A	fake	profile	spreading	hate	speech,	this	must	be	a	violation	of	the	rules?	 (Comment	by	group	member,	1	July	2015)		After	numerous	additional	reports,	Facebook’s	verdict	would	often	be	reversed,	causing	users	to	post	new	screenshots	accompanied	with	statements	of	celebration:	“Together	WE	ARE	STRONG…	evil	will	be	conquered	in	this	way!	<3”	(Comment	by	group	member,	2	July	2015).	The	pattern	of	reversed	verdicts	from	Facebook	caused	members	to	speculate	that	the	company	at	first	responds	algorithmically	to	filed	reports	and	only	later	involves	actual	human	staff:	“Keep	reporting	the	profiles.	Facebook	uses	robots	to	go	through	the	complaints.	Real	humans	will	only	look	into	it	if	there	are	lots	of	reports”	(Comment	by	group	member,	22	June	2015).			As	exemplified	by	the	above	quotes,	group	members	felt	empowered	through	their	collective	contestation,	as	it	enabled	them	to	influence	(what	were	otherwise	felt	to	be)	unwavering	decisions	made	by	Facebook.	Simultaneously,	however,	group	members	also	felt	disempowered	by	Facebook’s	secrecy	and	lack	of	collaboration,	with	no	apparent	interest	in	the	group’s	crowdsourced	activism.	The	group’s	power	seemed	to	lie	solely	in	its	size.	Group	members	and	the	group	administrator	would	therefore	repeatedly	emphasise	the	
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importance	of	all	members	filing	as	many	reports	as	possible	and	complaining	if	Facebook	did	not	respond	positively	to	their	request(s):			 We	need	to	keep	reporting	his	[the	anonymous	administrator’s]	page.	At	some	point,	Facebook	will	get	tired	and	look	at	what	he’s	actually	written.	This	is	how	we	shut	his	page	down.	We’re	almost	1300	members,	and	if	we	all	spend	5	seconds	reporting	his	page,	it’ll	be	removed	in	no	time.		(Post	by	group	administrator,	1	July	2015).		The	contestation	surrounding	Facebook’s	‘report’	button	shows	how	Stop	Fake	
Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	engaged	in	tactical	socio-technical	negotiations,	continuously	attempting	to	unlock	Facebook’s	secretive	digital	architecture	and	use	it	strategically	to	further	its	cause.	These	strategies	proved	largely	successful,	as	contested	hate	profiles	often	only	existed	for	a	few	days	before	Facebook	removed	them	(see	Table	1).			 <	Insert	Table	1	-	Overview	of	fake	hate	profiles	and	their	durations	of	existence.	>	
	
(2)	Alerting	users		On	several	occasions,	hate	profiles	contested	by	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	
Facebook	received	hundreds	or	even	thousands	of	comments	from	Danish	Facebook	users.	Most	users	accepted	the	proclaimed	Muslim	identities	and	expressed	anger,	hostility,	and	even	racism:			
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Fuck	you,	you	fucking	monkey	(User	comment,	Mohammed	El-Sayed,	1	July	2015)	Disgusting	animal!	Get	the	fuck	out	of	my	country…	you	don’t	belong	here!	(User	comment,	Mehmet	Dawah	Aydemir	[1],	11	September	2015)	It’s	because	of	people	like	you	that	more	and	more	people	turn	racist	(User	comments,	Mehmet	Dawah	Aydemir	[1],	11	September	2015).			
Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	sought	to	dismantle	this	hatred	towards	Muslims	and	immigrants	by	alerting	users	that	the	profiles	were	fake	and	deliberately	created	to	incite	aggression.	Group	members	would	post	comments	on	the	profiles,	warning	users	not	to	believe	in	the	proclaimed	identities	and	political	manipulation.	After	making	such	comments,	members	would	notify	each	other	of	their	actions	within	the	closed	group:	“Wrote	on	his	page,	a	warning	and	a	link	to	this	group”	(Comment	by	group	member,	1	July	2015).		The	anonymous	page	administrator(s)	running	the	fake	hate	profiles,	however,	continuously	sabotaged	these	efforts.	On	all	Facebook	profiles	and	pages,	administrators	can	remove	any	content	without	notifying	its	author	and	can	block	any	user	from	making	(additional)	comments.	The	administrator(s)	of	the	fake	hate	profiles	systematically	used	this	technological	feature	to	their	advantage	by	deleting	all	comments	and	blocking	all	users	who	contested	their	proclaimed	authorship.	New	users	encountering	the	hate	profiles	would	thus	be	exposed	exclusively	to	user	comments	affirming	the	legitimacy	of	the	
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sources.	Group	members	and	their	warnings	were	continuously	deleted	and	blocked	even	though	they	still	attempted	to	alert	users:			 You	get	blocked	so	fast	in	there,	but	at	least	I	got	to	post	20	times	that	the	page	was	fake	before	it	was	over.	(Comment	by	group	member,	1	July	2015);		I	was	removed	right	away!!	The	person	behind	must	know	that	we	work	together	and	are	on	his	trail!!	 (Comment	by	group	member,	1	July	2015).			Due	to	the	systematic	moderation	performed	by	the	anonymous	page	administrator(s),	the	effectiveness	of	the	group’s	efforts	to	alert	users	as	to	the	existence	of	fake	Muslim	hate	profiles	seems	to	have	been	limited.	The	administrators	of	the	hate	profiles	tactically	exploited	Facebook’s	digital	architecture	to	silence	any	contestation.	Nevertheless,	a	few	group	members	reported	that	they	had	in	fact	first	believed	in	the	fake	authorship	and	only	later	became	aware	of	its	deceptive	nature	due	to	comments	made	by	group	members:	“Yesterday,	I	really	thought	that	someone	was	being	this	hostile	and	I	jumped	in	feet	first	and	cursed	him	back.	I’m	glad	someone	told	me	it	was	fake.”	(Comment	by	group	member,	12	September	2015).	This	highlights	how	the	struggle	between	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	and	various	fake	hate	profiles	fundamentally	concerned	visibility	and	awareness.	The	hate	profiles	sought	to	render	all	contestation	invisible,	leaving	only	comments	accepting	the	proclaimed	authorship.	The	group’s	goal,	in	contrast,	was	to	make	its	
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contestation	as	visible	as	possible	to	warn	users	while	simultaneously	making	the	pages	invisible	(through	deletion	by	Facebook).			In	several	respects,	Facebook’s	digital	architecture	seems	to	have	supported	the	hate	profiles’	agenda	by	providing	unlimited	anonymity	to	their	administrator(s)	as	well	as	asymmetrical	power	relations	between	administrator(s)	and	users	(e.g.	through	the	ability	to	remove	any	comment).	The	counter	group’s	efforts	to	alert	users	regarding	fake	hate	profiles	might	have	furthermore	had	the	unforeseen	consequence	of	contributing	to	their	proliferation.	Facebook’s	algorithms	continuously	evaluate	content	and	‘decide’	how	far	it	should	spread	based	on	a	number	of	parameters.	A	central	parameter	in	this	process	is	the	number	of	likes,	comments,	and	shares	received	by	the	content	in	question	(Bucher,	2012).	Comments	posted	by	members	of	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	to	warn	users	might	thus	have	indirectly	increased	the	fake	hate	profiles’	reach,	potentially	deceiving	additional	Facebook	users.	Thus,	despite	the	group’s	collective	efforts,	fake	hate	profiles	continued	to	pose	a	complex	challenge.	As	we	discuss	below,	however,	the	group	also	pursued	the	goal	of	making	their	contestation	visible	outside	of	Facebook.		
(3)	Alerting	journalists	and	authorities	Although	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	primarily	operated	within	the	boundaries	of	social	media,	the	group	also	sought	to	reach	out	and	involve	journalists	and	authorities	in	their	struggle.		The	group	managed	to	attract	the	attention	of	several	major	Danish	media	institutions,	including	the	national	
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tabloid	Ekstra	Bladet	(Ryde,	2015),	the	newspaper	Information	(Skovhus,	2015),	and	the	TV	broadcaster	TV2.	These	media	outlets	all	reported	on	the	phenomenon	of	fake	hate	profiles	on	Facebook,	the	latter	two	interviewing	the	group’s	administrator	as	part	of	their	coverage.	The	public	outreach	agenda	pursued	by	the	group	was	primarily	undertaken	to	warn	the	Danish	public	about	potential	democratic	dangers	posed	by	fake	hate	profiles.	Simultaneously,	it	enabled	the	group	to	attract	more	members	to	participate	in	their	struggle.	These	efforts	largely	proved	successful.	Yet	as	with	the	group’s	efforts	to	warn	users	on	Facebook,	the	increased	attention	to	fake	hate	profiles	achieved	through	mass	media	could	potentially	also	have	led	more	users	to	engage	with	the	profiles,	indirectly	increasing	their	proliferation	on	Facebook.		In	parallel	with	the	group’s	efforts	to	reach	journalists,	group	members	also	contacted	the	Danish	police	and	the	intelligence	agency	(PET)	in	order	to	instigate	investigations	into	the	originators	of	the	fake	hate	profiles.	The	ephemerality	of	the	contested	content,	however,	presented	an	obstacle	to	this	agenda.	The	short	time	periods	in	which	the	fake	hate	profiles	existed	meant	that	archived	material	was	necessary	in	order	to	file	police	reports.	The	group	addressed	this	challenge	by	working	collectively	to	compile	such	material:			 REQUEST:	A	member	is	asking	for	screenshots	from	the	hate	profiles	that	have	been	shut	down	since	the	police	want	to	look	into	the	case…	please	send	them	to	me	in	a	private	message	or	post	them	below,	so	they’re	visible.		(Post	by	group	administrator,	2	July	2015)		
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In	addition	to	the	challenge	of	piecing	together	deleted	evidence,	the	ephemerality	and	anonymity	of	fake	hate	profiles	proved	problematic.	Ephemerality	of	content	meant	that	authorities	could	never	observe	the	consequences	of	fake	hate	profiles	as	they	unfolded.	Furthermore,	the	complete	anonymity	of	fake	hate	profile	creators,	enabled	by	Facebook’s	design,	meant	that	no	charges	could	be	filed	directly	against	anyone.	Doing	so	would	first	require	a	thorough	investigation	and	close	contact	with	Facebook.	This	caused	frustration	and	feelings	of	disempowerment	for	members	of	Stop	
Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook,	as	the	social	media	company	showed	no	apparent	interest	in	collaborating	with	them.	The	group	was	thus	totally	reliant	on	Danish	authorities	for	conducting	investigations,	yet	the	group	also	experienced	a	lack	of	support	from	authorities	in	identifying	and	investigating	the	creators	of	fake	hate	profiles.	This	caused	distress:		 I	don’t	understand	why	IT	specialists	in	the	police	can’t	find	their	[the	administrator’s]	IP	address…	These	fake	profiles	are	so	far	out…	(Comment	by	group	member,	13	September	2015)	I	don’t	think	we	can	achieve	anything	through	police	reports.		 	 (Comment	by	group	member,	1	July	2015)		The	most	powerful	means	available	to	members	of	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	
Facebook	thus	continued	to	be	their	collective	efforts	to	report	fake	hate	profiles	to	Facebook	and	get	them	deleted.	Yet	this	strategy	had	severe	limitations,	as	the	group	could	never	get	to	the	root	of	the	problem	due	to	Facebook’s	digital	architecture	and	(apparent)	lack	of	interest	in	collaboration.	
re-p int version
	 21	
The	anonymous	creators	of	fake	hate	profiles	could	continuously	(re-)create	new	fictitious	identities	each	time	old	ones	were	removed.	For	members	of	
Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook,	this	caused	frustration,	even	in	situations	in	which	Facebook	deleted	fake	hate	profiles:	“Yes	:)!	Finally,	they	[the	fake	hate	profiles]	are	removed..	but	he	[the	anonymous	administrator]	will	just	create	a	new	one	:(	:(“(Comment	by	group	member,	1	July	2015).	The	lack	of	collaboration	from	authorities	and	Facebook	led	to	investigations	by	group	members	to	identify	the	anonymous	content	creators.		
(4)	Speculating	about	culprits	A	recurring	theme	within	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	was	speculations	as	to	who	were	behind	the	fake	hate	profiles	combatted	by	the	group.	On	Facebook,	all	page	and	profile	administrators	can	remain	completely	anonymous.	Even	if	a	page	or	profile	is	removed,	no	information	is	provided	as	to	who	created	it.	Due	to	numerous	similarities	across	different	fake	hate	profiles,	group	members	became	convinced	that	several	profiles	were	created	by	the	same	administrator(s):	“This	is	exactly	the	same	rhetoric	as	on	the	last	one.	It’s	the	same	person	who’s	behind	it,	fucking	coward”	(Comment	by	group	member,	24	October	2015);	“You	just	know	it’s	a	20-year-old	kid	with	no	friends	and	Nazi	tendencies	who’s	behind	the	keyboard.”	(Comment	by	group	member,	1	July	2015).	Several	members	expressed	frustration	at	the	ability	of	the	anonymous	administrator(s)	to	continually	construct	new	fake	hate	profiles	and	spark	aggression,	even	though	Facebook	continually	deleted	the	pages.	Members	also	expressed	hope	that	authorities	would	react	and	investigate	the	culprits:	“I	really	hope	he	[the	administrator]	will	be	punished	
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for	the	hatred	he	creates”	(Comment	by	group	member,	12	September	2015).	Others	conducted	their	own	detective	work	and	formulated	hypotheses	about	specific	people	who	could	be	behind	the	profiles,	including	far-right	activists.	Such	speculations	were,	however,	criticised	by	other	members,	who	argued	that	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	should	not	become	a	vigilante	group:	“This	is	exactly	what	I	mean.	A	suspicion	isn’t	enough	to	accuse	people”	(Comment	by	group	member,	12	September	2015).	The	group	never	successfully	identified	any	hate	content	creators,	though	there	were	strong	indications	that	several	of	the	fake	hate	profiles	combatted	by	the	group	had	the	same	administrator(s).			
Crowdsourced	social	media	activism	Having	explored	the	activist	practices	of	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook,	we	now	address	how	group	members	navigated	Facebook’s	social	media	logics	in	their	struggle	against	fake	hate	profiles.	We	furthermore	discuss	whether	the	group’s	crowdsourced	activism	proved	successful	in	terms	of	its	overarching	goal	of	stopping	fake	hate	profiles.	The	group’s	crowdsourced	contestation	and	reporting	does	indeed	seem	to	have	succeed	in	shortening	the	lifespans	of	fake	hate	profiles	(see	Figure	1).	Fake	hate	profiles	studied	in	our	research	that	existed	prior	to	the	group’s	formation	existed	significantly	longer	than	did	profiles	that	were	created	after	the	group’s	formation.	Facebook,	however,	maintains	in	its	community	standards	that	quantity	of	reports	does	not	influence	the	evaluation	of	flagged	content	(Facebook,	2016).	Facebook’s	opaque	evaluation	procedures	mean	that	different	factors	could	have	had	an	impact.		
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	 <	Insert	Figure	1	-	Lifespans	of	fake	hate	profiles	before	and	after	the	formation	of	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook.	>		Temporality	is	not	the	only	available	parameter	for	evaluating	the	groups’	struggle	against	fake	hate	profiles.	Some	profiles	that	existed	for	the	shortest	periods	of	time	(and	were	created	after	the	group’s	formation)	were	also	those	that	received	the	most	comments	and	shares	from	Danish	Facebook	users	(see	
Figure	2).	For	example,	a	profile	named	Mehmet	Dawah	Aydemir	[1],	which	existed	for	less	than	two	days	in	September	2015,	managed	to	attract	10,426	comments	and	4954	shares	within	this	period.	Most	commenting	users	did	not	recognise	the	page’s	deceptive	character.	Its	rapid	proliferation	can	partially	be	explained	by	Facebook’s	algorithmic	prioritisation	of	short	time	decays	when	assessing	the	importance	of	content	and	‘deciding’	its	reach	(Bucher,	2012).	Posts,	images,	and	videos	can	in	other	words	reach	thousands	of	users	within	hours	if	they	spark	a	large	number	of	interactions.	This	seems	to	have	been	the	case	with	Mehmet	Dawah	Aydemir	[1].	 	<	Insert	Figure	2	-	Times	of	existence	of	fake	hate	profiles	and	numbers	of	comments	and	shares.	>		Although	Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	successfully	reduced	the	lifespans	of	fake	hate	profiles,	the	profiles	could	still	deceive	and	provoke	thousands	of	users	within	this	period.	Lifespan,	then,	does	not	seem	to	be	the	best	indicator	of	the	group’s	success	in	dismantling	fake	hate	profiles.	This	
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raises	the	question	of	whether	this	form	of	crowdsourced	activism	represents	a	viable	trajectory	for	stopping	hatred	and	manipulation	on	social	media.	Should	it	be	up	to	users	to	stop	phenomena	such	as	fake	hate	profiles	on	Facebook?	Or	should	social	media	companies	take	greater	responsibility?			Based	on	the	challenges	and	limitations	facing	the	crowdsourced	activism	of	
Stop	Fake	Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook,	we	argue	that	Facebook’s	delegation	to	users	of	responsibility	for	reporting	violations	is	problematic.	Unless	social	media	corporations	take	greater	responsibility	in	combatting	faceless	hatred	and	racism	produced	by	anonymous	administrators,	no	action	can	go	beyond	solely	closing	down	such	hate	profiles.	Reaching	out	to	and	collaborating	with	authorities	–	finding	content	and	identifying	its	creators	–	could	be	part	of	a	solution.	Removing	unlimited	anonymity	for	page	and	profile	administrators	could	be	another.	Such	efforts,	however,	would	require	Facebook	to	change	its	self-image,	which	is	currently	that	of	a	tech	company	and	not	a	media	company	(Seetharaman,	2016).	If	Facebook	is	to	stop	fake	hate	profiles	on	its	platform,	the	company	must	acknowledge	that	problems	associated	with	fake	identities	and	hatred	are	partially	its	responsibility	and	not	only	that	of	users.	This	argument	has	recently	been	raised	in	debates	concerning	‘fake	news’	(Stromer-Galley,	2016).	Hopefully,	future	research	can	help	address	these	issues	by	expanding	current	knowledge	on	the	extensiveness	of	fake	hate	profiles	on	social	media	as	well	as	related	phenomena	such	as	fake	news	spread	by	social	bots	(see	Shao	et	al.,	2017).	Such	efforts	could	advantageously	draw	upon	both	big	data	analysis	and	machine	learning	(see	Ferrara	et	al.,	2016).		
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On	the	basis	of	the	present	article’s	findings,	Facebook’s	limited	response	to	the	phenomenon	of	fake	hate	profiles	highlights	a	discrepancy	between	the	company’s	business	model	and	its	corporate	ideals.	Facebook’s	business	model	is	built	around	commodification	of	user-generated	data	and	user	attention,	making	the	quality	of	content	economically	secondary	to	the	attention	it	receives.	At	the	same	time,	Facebook’s	corporate	identity,	which	hijacks	left-wing	ideas	of	participation	and	decentralisation	(Žižek,	2009),	burdens	users	with	responsibility	for	tackling	problems	such	as	fake	hate	profiles.	In	this	process,	the	company	provides	only	limited	opportunities	for	users	to	engage	in	crowdsourced	activism.	Even	though	Facebook	refers	to	its	platform	as	a	“global	community”	(Facebook,	2016),	the	company	seems	to	prioritise	commodification	of	user	attention	over	the	empowerment	of	users	and	quality	of	content.				In	the	current	state	of	affairs,	crowdsourcing	of	responsibility	leaves	users	with	a	‘report’	button	as	their	only	weapon.	Even	if	fake	hate	profiles	only	exist	for	short	periods	of	time,	their	visibility	can	still	be	great	due	to	social	media	logics	that	algorithmically	privilege	content	that	quickly	attracts	comments,	likes,	and	shares	–	even	if	these	reactions	express	hatred	and	racism.	Although	Stop	Fake	
Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook	continuously	performed	crowdsourced	resistance,	Facebook’s	architecture	disempowered	the	group	by	limiting	its	possibilities	for	action,	while	fake	hate	profiles	could	continue	to	spur	hatred,	aggression,	hostility,	and	racism.	If	this	is	to	change,	social	media	companies	must	reduce	hierarchical	power	relations,	increase	the	potential	for	user	action,	and	take	responsibility	for	hatred	and	racism	on	their	platforms.		
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Name  Time period Number of days 
Ali El-Yussuf [3] 16/06-22/06 2015 7 
Mohammed El-Sayed 30/06-02/07 2015 3 
Fatimah El-Sayed 01/07-02/07 2015 2 
Zarah Al-Sayed 02/07-02/07 2015 1 
Mehmet Dawah Aydemir [1] 09/09-12/09 2015 4 
Mehmet Dawah Aydemir [2] 13/09-15/09 2015 2 
Ebrahim Said   24/10-25/10 2015 2 
Mohammed Al-Dawah 05/01-07/01 2016 3 
Table	1:	Overview	of	fake	hate	profiles	and	their	durations	of	existence.	
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Figure	1:	Lifespans	of	fake	hate	profiles	before	and	after	the	formation	of	Stop	Fake	
Hate	Profiles	on	Facebook.	
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Figure	2:	Times	of	existence	of	fake	hate	profiles	and	numbers	of	comments	and	shares.	
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